Submission Open for IJTEM Volume-2, Number-11, November 2019 | Submission Deadline- 20 November, 2019


International Journal of Tax Economics and Management

Information Economics Aspires

Author: Durad Cerk | Published on: 4 September, 2019   Page: 1-13

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Abstract
Researchers in the economics of information come from a variety of disciplines. While most economics of information research appears in economics and in the library and information science, Machlup and Mansfield in The Economics of Information: Interdisciplinary Messages note contributions from other fields including psychology, sociology, linguistics, communication, engineering, computer science, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and cybernetics. In this article, some important issues will distinctly be represented. Thus anybody can know about information economics and many data.

Keywords
Idea; Information; Acquisition; Tools; Distribution.

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Cerk, D. (2019), Information Economics Aspires. International Journal of Tax Economics and Management, 2(12), 1-13.

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    Cerk, D. (2019) "Information Economics Aspires", International Journal of Tax Economics and Management, 2(12), pp.1-13.

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    Cerk, D.. Information Economics Aspires. International Journal of Tax Economics and Management. 2019; 2(12): 1-13.

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    Cerk, D.. Information Economics Aspires. International Journal of Tax Economics and Management. 2019; 2(12): 1-13.

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    Cerk, D.. Information Economics Aspires. International Journal of Tax Economics and Management. 2019; 2(12): 1-13.

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  • Reference

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    10. Diamond, Peter. 1971. “A Model of Price Adjustment.” J. Econ. Theory 3 (2): 156–68.
    11. Dye, Ronald. 1985. “Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information.” J. Accounting Res. 23 (1): 123–45.
    12. Ely, Jeffrey, Alexander Frankel, and Emir Kamenica. 2015. “Suspense and Surprise.” J.P.E. 123 (1): 215–60.
    13. Eyster, Erik, and Matthew Rabin. 2014. “Extensive Imitation Is Irrational and Harmful.” Q. J.E. 129 (4): 1861–98.
    14. Grossman, Sanford. 1981. “The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality.” J. Law and Econ. 24 (3): 461–83.

    [This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).]

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    Author Details


    Durad Cerk
    Faculty of Economics and Informatics
    University of Novo Mesto
    duradcerk32@yahoo.com